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Abstract
In this article, we use data on five social inclusion indicators (poverty, inequality, unem-
ployment, education and health) to assess and compare the performance of 15 European
welfare states (EU15) over a 12-year period from 1995 to 2006. Aggregate measures of
performance are obtained using index number methods similar to those employed in the
construction of the widely used Human Development Index. These are compared with
alternative measures derived from data envelopment analysis methods. The influence of
methodology choice and the assumptions made in scaling indicators upon the results
obtained is illustrated and discussed. We then analyse the evolution of performance
over time, finding evidence of some convergence in performance and no sign of social
dumping. (JEL codes: H50, C14, D24)
Keywords: performance measure, best practice frontier, social protection.
1 Introduction
The European Union has adopted an interesting and intriguing approach
to achieve some kind of convergence in the field of social inclusion. This
approach is known as the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC).1 This
method requires the definition of common objectives and indicators,
which are then used to identify best practice performance. Member
states thus regularly know how well they are performing relative to the
other states. The implication being, that if a particular state is not per-
forming as well as some other states, it will hopefully be pushed by its
citizen-voters to improve its performance.2
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1 The open method of coordination is a process where explicit, clear, and mutually agreed
objectives are defined, after which peer review enables Member States to examine and
learn from the best practice in Europe. Commonly agreed upon indicators allow each
member state to find out where it stands. The exchange of information is designed with
the aim of institutionalizing policy mimicking. (Pochet, 2005).
2 OMC is related to yardstick competition. See on this Schleifer (1985). Yardstick compe-
tition is a method to overcome the information problems or the monitoring restrictions of
the authority (here the European Commission). It rests on comparative welfare evalua-
tion. Accordingly, each national government would exert more effort in order to enhance
their performance relative to their neighbors. The discipline effect of comparative perfor-
mance evaluation is expected to generate a sort of ‘yardstick competition’ among national
governments, with politicians mimicking the behavior of nearby governments.
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Thanks to the OMC, a variety of comparable and regularly updated
indicators have been developed for the appraisal of social protection poli-
cies. In this article, we focus our attention on five of the most commonly
used indicators, which relate to poverty, inequality, unemployment, edu-
cation, and health. The definitions of the indicators that we use are pres-
ented in Table 1.3 If we look closely at the scores it is evident that some
countries do well on some indicators but not on others. For example, in
2006 Spain has a good health indicator but a very bad poverty indicator,
while for Luxembourg it is the converse.
Thus, when comparing country A with country B, we are unable to
confidently say that A is doing better than B unless all five indicators in
country A are better than (or equal to) those in country B. To address this
issue, we could attempt to construct an aggregate indicator of social pro-
tection. Perhaps we could use methods similar to those used in construct-
ing the widely used Human Development Indicator (HDI)?4 That index
involves the scaling of its three composite indicators (education, health,
and income) so that they lie between zero and one, where the bounds are
set to reflect minimum and maximum targets selected by the authors. The
HDI is then constructed as an equal weighted sum of these three scaled
indicators.
In this article, we wish to construct an aggregate index of social protec-
tion, so that we can address questions such as ‘Is country A doing better
than country B?’ and ‘Is country A improving over time?’ Various choices
need to be made regarding the methods we use. First, should we use a
linear aggregation function as is used in the HDI? Second, how should we
scale our indicators—especially those indicators where a higher value is
bad (e.g., unemployment)? Third, should we allocate equal weights to each
of the five indicators?5 If not, how should we determine the weights?
Should it be based on a survey of experts, as was done in the World
Health Organisation health system efficiency project (WHO, 2000) or
could some form of econometric technique be used? Fourth, should we
insist that all countries have the same set of weights or should we allow
them to differ so as to reflect different priorities in different countries (for
example, see the analysis of the WHO data by Lauer et al. 2004)?6 Fifth,
should we include an input measure, such as government expenditure as a
share of GDP on these activities, so as to produce a measure of the effi-
ciency of the social protection system instead of just an output index?
3 These are for the 15 European Union members prior to the enlargement of 2005.
4 See Anand and Sen (1994).
5 The issues of weights and scaling are of course related.
6 One could also allow the weights to vary across time periods.
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The prime objective of our article is to go beyond the indeterminacy that
is implicit (and voluntarily so) to the OMC and to provide a single index
reflecting the performance of European welfare states. Such an index allows
us to make performance comparisons across countries and over time.
The question one can raise at this point is that of the relevancy of our
partial indicators and thus of our single index as a measure of the perfor-
mance of the welfare state. This brings us back to the performance
approach, according to which the performance of an organization or of
a production unit is defined by the extent to which it achieves the objec-
tives that it is expected to fulfil. In the case of the welfare state, the
Table 1 Indicators of exclusion: definitions and correlations
Definition
POV: At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers as defined as the share of
persons with an equivalized disposable income below the risk-of-
poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equiv-
alized disposable income (after social transfers).
INE: Inequality of income distribution as defined as the ratio of total income
received by the 20% of the population with the highest income (top
quintile) to that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest
income (lowest quintile). Income must be understood as equivalized
disposable income.
UNE: Long-term unemployed (12 months or longer) as a share of the total
active population harmonized with national monthly unemployment
estimates.
EDU: Early school leavers as the percentage of the population aged 18–24
with at most lower secondary education and not in further education
or training.
EXP: Life expectancy as the number of years a person may be expected to
live, starting at age 0.
Correlation
POV INE UNE EDU EXP
POV 1.000
INE 0.908 1.000
UNE 0.397 0.390 1.000
EDU 0.647 0.774 0.272 1.000
EXP 0.048 0.085 0.014 0.209 1.000
Source: The five indicators are taken from the Eurostat database on Laeken indicators
(2007).
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common view is that it has two main missions: to protect individuals
against lifetime risks such as unemployment, sickness, disability, etc.
and to alleviate all forms of poverty. Ideally, to check the contribution
of the welfare state to the fulfilment of these two missions, one should be
able to compute the level of social welfare with and without the welfare
state. Namely, with and without the various tax-transfer policies that are
part of social protection and the numerous protective regulations of
modern welfare states. Needless to say, such an endeavor is, at this
point, unrealistic for reasons of methodology and data availability. One
thus has to resort to imperfect tools to measure the level of social
well-being and the contribution of the welfare state to that level.
The five indicators we are using here cover the most relevant concerns of
a modern welfare state; they also reflect aspects that people who want to
enlarge the concept of GDP to better measure social welfare generally take
into account.7 Their choice is determined by the objectives of the welfare
state and, in that respect, they are not as comprehensive as would be
considered if one was to attempt to measure social welfare. For example,
we do not include a measure of average income or an indicator of envi-
ronmental quality.
We assume that these five partial indicators as well as the aggregate
indicator measure the actual outcomes of the welfare state, what we call
its performance. It would be interesting to also measure the true contri-
bution of the welfare state to that performance and hence to evaluate to
what extent the welfare state, with its financial and regulatory means, gets
close to the best practice frontier. We argue that this exercise which in
production theory amounts to the measurement of productive efficiency, is
highly questionable at this level of aggregation.
In this article, we focus on the measurement of performance of 15 wel-
fare states over a 12-year period. Besides comparing those welfare states,
we purport to check if there is any convergence in social inclusion indica-
tors. More importantly, we want to check whether there is any sign of
social dumping. Following the increasing integration of European socie-
ties, it is feared that social protection might be subject to a ‘race to the
bottom’.8 As we show convergence is happening and social dumping is
not.
At this point, two words of caution are in order. They concern the
scope of our exercise and the quality of data. When we compare the per-
formance of the welfare state across states and over time or when we check
evidence of convergence we do not intend to explain these outcomes by the
7 See, e.g. the classical measurable economic welfare (MEW) developed by Nordhaus and
Tobin (1972) and more recently the Stiglitz report (Stiglitz et al. 2009).
8 Sinn (1990), Cremer and Pestieau (2004).
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social programs comprising the welfare state. We realize that many factors
may explain differences in performance or any process of catching up.
First, the welfare state is not restricted to spending but includes also a
battery of regulatory measures that contribute to protect people against
lifetime risks and alleviate poverty.
Second, as we have already noted, contextual factors, such as family
structure, culture, and climate, may explain educational or health out-
comes as much as anything else. This is why we limit our exercise to
what we call performance assessment and argue against the extension to
efficiency analysis.
The second word of caution concerns the data we use. They are pro-
vided by the EU member states within the OMC. They deal with key
dimensions of individual well-being; and are comparable across countries
(15 here and very soon 27) and over time. It is difficult to find better data
for the purpose at hand. This being said, we realize that they can be per-
fected. There is some discontinuity in the series of inequality and poverty
indicators due to the transition from ECHP to EUSILC. Also some fig-
ures were missing for some years and some countries. For them we filled
the gap by simple extrapolation. In addition, one could argue that life
expectancy in good health is likely to be preferred to life expectancy at
birth or an absolute measure of poverty might be better than a relative
measure that is too closely related to income inequality. But for the time
being, these alternatives do not exist at least for so many countries and
years.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we
assess the performance of 15 European welfare states for the most recent
year, 2006, using a number of social indicators. This involves the construc-
tion of an aggregate measure using a similar methodology to that used in
the HDI. In Section 3, we use a frontier measurement technique known as
data envelopment analysis (DEA) to construct an alternative aggregate
measure, which allows weights to differ across countries. In Section 4, we
discuss the issue of performance measurement versus efficiency measure-
ment, while in Section 5 we assess the sensitivity of our results to alterna-
tive scaling methods. In section 6 we look at the trend over a period of
12 years, searching for evidence of convergence or divergence, while a final
section provides some concluding comments.
2 Constructing an aggregate social protection index
We have selected five indicators among those provided by Eurostat. Our
selection was based on two concerns: choosing the most relevant data and
making sure that they cover a sufficient number of years (12) and
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countries (15). The indicators given in Table 1 reflect different facets of
social exclusion. Table 1 provides also the coefficient of correlation among
these indicators. The first four indicators poverty (POV), inequality (INE),
unemployment (UNE), and education (EDU) are such that we want them
as low as possible, while life expectancy (EXP) is the only ‘positive’
indicator.
The five indicators listed in Table 1 are measured in different units. Can
we normalize them in such a way that they are comparable? The original
Human Development Report (HDR, 1990) suggested that the n-th indi-










so that for each indicator the highest score is one and the lowest is zero.











so that the country with the lowest rate of unemployment will receive a
score of one and the one with the highest rate of unemployment will
receive zero.
Table 2 gives the normalized indicators for the year 2006, the most
recent for which we have data. For each indicator, the performance of
each country can be assessed relative to the best practice (the country with
a score of one).
Not surprisingly, the Nordic countries lead the pack for inequality,
Denmark for unemployment and Finland for education. The
Netherlands is first for poverty and Spain for longevity. The worse per-
formers are Portugal for education and inequality, Greece for poverty,
Germany for unemployment, and Denmark for longevity.
How can we aggregate these five scaled indicators to obtain an overall
assessment of social protection performance? One option is to again






9 The acronym, SPI1, refers to social protection index number one. The number one is
added, because later in this article we investigate the sensitivity of our results to the use
of alternative data scaling methods.
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This has been done and the values obtained are reported in column 7
of Table 2. As it appears, Sweden is the best ranked and Portugal last.
More generally, at the top one finds the Nordic countries, plus Austria,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and at the bottom the Southern
countries.
Given the observed maximum and minimum values in the 2006 data, we






















21 10 ¼ 0:018, ð5Þ
and doing the same for the remaining four indicators we obtain 0.059,
0.043, 0.006, and 0.074, respectively.









Table 2 Normalized scores and social protection index, 2006
POV INE UNE EDU EXP SPI1 Rank
AT 0.73 0.91 0.89 0.96 0.63 0.82 4
BE 0.55 0.76 0.28 0.86 0.41 0.57 9
DE 0.73 0.79 0.00 0.82 0.56 0.58 8
DK 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.00 0.75 6
ES 0.09 0.44 0.15 0.30 1.00 0.40 14
FI 0.73 0.94 0.77 1.00 0.44 0.78 5
FR 0.73 0.82 0.79 0.87 0.93 0.83 2
GR 0.00 0.21 0.87 0.75 0.41 0.45 12
IE 0.27 0.56 0.57 0.87 0.48 0.55 10
IT 0.09 0.38 0.34 0.60 0.63 0.41 13
LU 0.64 0.76 0.87 0.71 0.37 0.67 7
NL 1.00 0.88 0.81 0.85 0.59 0.83 2
PT 0.27 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.19 0.16 15
SE 0.82 0.97 0.94 0.88 0.96 0.91 1
UK 0.18 0.41 0.91 0.85 0.33 0.54 11
Mean 0.51 0.66 0.64 0.75 0.53 0.62
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For example, taking poverty and unemployment we obtain 0.043/
(0.018) ¼ 2.4. That is, the aggregation process implicitly assumes that
reducing the long-term unemployment rate by 1% is worth the same as a
reduction in the poverty rate of 2.4%. Is this what we expected this index
to do? What do these relative weights reflect? Are they meant to reflect our
social preference function or do they reflect the relative quantities of
resources (public expenditure) that would be needed to achieve these
things?
To answer these questions we need to do further work. One could per-
haps conduct surveys of the general population or of a group of experts to
gain some insights into social preferences. However, this exercise is beyond
the scope of the current study. Regarding the second option of looking at
resource trade-offs, one could attempt to use the sample data to estimate a
production technology, and then implicitly use the shadow price informa-
tion to identify weights. This latter option has the advantage that it can
allow weights to differ across countries, depending upon the mix of objec-
tives that a country chooses to focus upon. We investigate the production
technology option in the next section.
3 Data envelopment analysis
The above index construction method described in the previous section
uses implicit weights that one could argue are rather arbitrary. One pos-
sible solution to this problem is the use of the DEA method.10 DEA is
traditionally used to measure the technical efficiency scores of a sample of
firms. For example, in the case of agriculture, one would collect data on
the inputs and outputs of a sample of farms. Output variables could be
wheat and beef, while the input variables could be land, labor, capital,
materials, and services. The DEA method involves running a sequence of
linear programs which fit a production frontier surface over the data
points, defined by a collection of intersecting hyper-planes. The DEA
method produces a technical efficiency score for each firm in the
sample. This is a value between zero and one which reflects the degree
to which the firm is near the frontier. A value of one indicates that the firm
is on the frontier and is fully efficient, while a value of 0.8 indicates that
10 For example, see Coelli et al. (2005) for details of the DEA method. See also Cherchye
et al. (2004) who use the DEA in a setting close to this one. The DEA method is pres-
ented in the working paper version of this article: http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/
crepp-wp200903.pdf.
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the firm is producing 80% of its potential output given the input vector
it has.11
In the case of the production of social protection, we could conceptu-
alize a production process where each country is a ‘firm’ which uses gov-
ernment resources to produce social outputs such as reduced
unemployment and longer life expectancies. At this stage of the article,
we will assume that each country has one ‘‘government’’ and hence one
unit of input, and it produces the five outputs discussed above.12
The DEA efficiency score are reported in column 4 of Table 3.
A number of observations can be made. First, we note that 40% of
the sample receives a DEA efficiency score of one (indicating that they
are fully efficient). This is not unusual in a DEA analysis where the
number of dimensions (variables) is large relative to the number of obser-
vations. Second, the mean DEA score is 0.89 versus the mean SPI score of
Table 3 Performance scores and ranks, 2006
SPI1 DEA1 DEA1-I
Scores Rank Scores Rank Scores Rank
AT 0.82 4 1.000 1 0.972 8
BE 0.57 9 0.866 13 0.744 13
DE 0.58 8 0.879 12 0.872 11
DK 0.75 6 1.000 1 0.946 9
ES 0.40 14 1.000 1 1.000 1
FI 0.78 5 1.000 1 1.000 1
FR 0.83 2 0.983 7 0.942 10
GR 0.45 12 0.899 9 0.977 7
IE 0.55 10 0.890 11 1.000 1
IT 0.41 13 0.672 14 0.700 14
LU 0.67 7 0.897 10 1.000 1
NL 0.83 2 1.000 1 1.000 1
PT 0.16 15 0.374 15 0.393 15
SE 0.91 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
UK 0.54 11 0.938 8 0.869 12
Mean 0.62 0.893 0.871
11 This is known as an output orientated efficiency score. It reflects the degree to which the
output vector of the i-th firm can be proportionally expanded (with inputs fixed), while
still remaining within the feasible production set defined by the DEA frontier. One can
also define input-orientated technical efficiency scores, which relate to the degree to
which inputs can be contracted (with outputs fixed).
12 Later in this article, we look at the possibility of measuring the input using government
expenditure measures.
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0.62. The DEA scores tend to be higher because they are relative to
observed best practice, while the SPI scores are relative to an ‘ideal’ case
where all scaled indicators equal one. Third, the DEA rankings are
‘broadly similar’ to the index number rankings. However, a few countries
do experience large changes, such as Spain which is ranked 14 in the index
numbers but is found to be fully efficient in the DEA results.13
Why do we observe differences between the rankings in DEA versus the
index numbers? There are two primary reasons. First, the index numbers
allocate an equal weight of 1/5 to each indicator, while in the DEA method
the weights used can vary across the five indicators because they are deter-
mined by the slope of the production possibility frontier that is con-
structed using the LP methods. Second, the implicit weights (or shadow
prices) in DEA can also vary from country to country because the slope of
the frontier can differ for different output (indicator) mixes.
To investigate this issue, we have used the shadow price information
from the dual DEA LP to obtain implicit price weights for each country.
The means of these weights are found to be 0.062, 0.067, 0.237, 0.460, and
0.174 for POV, INE, UNE, EDU, and EXP, respectively. The first thing
we note is that the scaled poverty and inequality indicators are given a
fairly small weight in the DEA models, while the education indicator is
given a weight much larger than 0.2. These results suggest that the uniform
weights of 0.2 (used in the SPI) understate the effort needed to improve
education outcomes versus reducing inequality and poverty. This may be
because education outcomes are quite uniformly high amongst this group
of countries, while inequality levels vary quite a bit, especially when one
compares Northern Europe with the rest. Thus, getting a unit change in
education outcomes is likely to involve a lot of effort relative to these other
indicators.14
4 Measuring efficiency with or without inputs
In traditional measures of production efficiency of public services or
public utilities, we gather data on both outputs and inputs and construct
13 The favorable DEA scores for Spain are due primarily to the fact that it has the best life
expectancy score in the sample, which puts it at the edge of the five-dimensional data
space and hence gives it a higher likelihood of being found to be efficient because of the
convexity of the DEA frontier.
14 Two weighting methods are described that involve either setting all weights to 0.2, versus
using the shadow prices derived from the DEA frontier to set them. A third option is to
use ‘weights restricted DEA’, which allows the weights to be selected within pre-set
bounds. This method is a ‘mix’ of these two ideas, and is useful if one has strong
views regarding the upper and lower bounds that should apply to one or more of
these weights. For more on weights restricted DEA methods, see Allen et al. (1997).
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a best practice frontier using either a parametric (regression) or
non-parametric (e.g. DEA) technique. So doing we are able to say that
if a production unit has a certain degree of inefficiency, it means that it can
do better with the same quantity of inputs or do as well with less inputs.
This approach is very useful and should be used to assess the efficiency of
the public sector under two key conditions: availability of data and the
existence of an underlying technology. For example, measuring the effi-
ciency of railways companies with this approach makes sense. Railways
transport people and commodities (hopefully with comfort and punctual-
ity) using a certain number of identifiable inputs.
When dealing with the public sector as a whole and more particularly
social protection, one can easily identify its missions: social inclusion in
terms of housing, education, health, work, and consumption. Yet, it is
difficult to relate indicators pertaining to these missions (e.g. our five
indicators) to specific inputs. A number of papers15 use social spending
as the input, but one has to realize that for most indicators of inclusion,
social spending explains little. For example, it is well known that for
health and education factors such as diet and family support are often
just as important as public spending. This does not mean that public
spending in health and in education is worth nothing; it just means that
it is part of a complex process in which other factors play a crucial and
complementary role.
In column 6 of Table 3, we present the DEA measures using social
spending as an input.16 The results are not surprising. Countries that
spend little and had a low performance now become the most efficient.
This is the case of Ireland and Luxembourg. Can we conclude that by
spending differently Germany or France would do better? Not necessarily.
Doing better can be related to matters independent from social programs:
a better diet, a less stressful life, an increased parental investment in edu-
cation, a more flexible labour market, etc. For these matters there might
be room for public action but not in financial terms.
Does that mean that the financing side does not matter? Not really. It is
important to make sure that wastes are minimized, but wastes cannot be
measured at such an aggregate level. It is difficult to think of a
well-defined technology which ‘produces’ social indicators with inputs.
As a consequence, indicators such as DEA1-I presented in Table 3, can
lead to erroneous conclusions. To evaluate the efficiency slacks of the
public sector, it is desirable to analyse micro-components of the welfare
states such as schools, hospitals, public agencies, public institution,
15 Afonso et al. (2006, 2005) and Afonso and St Aubyn (2005).
16 See http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/crepp-wp200903.pdf for data on social expendi-
ture by country in the period 1995–2006.
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railways, etc.17,18 At the macro-level, one should stop short of measuring
technical inefficiency and restrict oneself to performance ranking.
To again use the analogy of a classroom, it makes sense to rank students
according to how they perform in a series of exams. Admittedly one can
question the quality of tests or the weights used in adding marks from
different fields. Yet, in general, there is little discussion as to the grading of
students. At the same time, we know that these students may face different
‘environmental conditions’ which can affect their ability to perform. For
example, if we have two students ranked number 1 and 2 and if the latter is
forced to work at night to help ailing parents or to commute a long way
from home, it is possible that he can be considered as more deserving or
meritorious than the number 1 whose material and family conditions are
ideal. This being said there exists no ranking of students according to
merit. The concept of ‘‘merit’’ is indeed too controversial. By the same
token, we should not use social spending as an indicator of the ‘merit’ of
social protection systems.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In Section 2, it was noted that one criticism of the HDI-type approach is
that the implicit weights depend upon the composition of the sample. For
example, if some of the more recent EU member states were added to the
sample we may find that ranges of some indicators may change and hence
the relative sizes of the partial derivatives may also change. This could lead
to a change in rankings for some countries.
One way to partially, but not fully, address this issue would be to adopt
the approach used by Afonso et al. (2005) in an international comparison
of public sector efficiency. They addressed the scaling issue by scaling each
indicator by its sample mean. In the case of ‘negative’ indicators they
inverted them before doing this. This method is likely to be more stable
because the sample mean is likely to be less sensitive in the face of sample
expansion, relative to the sample range (i.e. maxmin).
















17 For example, see Pestieau and Tulkens (1993).
18 See Ravaillon (2005) for discussion of this issue.
page 12 of 23 CESifo Economic Studies, 2010
M. Lefebvre et al.








This derivative is not a constant (unlike that in equation 5). It is smaller
for larger values of the poverty indicator, ceteris paribus. One could
argue that this is reasonable since the marginal cost of reducing poverty
is likely to be large when poverty rates are very small. However, one
could alternatively argue that the social value of reducing poverty in
that situation is low.
This derivative when evaluated at the sample mean is equal to 0.012.
Furthermore, for the remaining four indicators we obtain 0.042, 0.057,
0.011, and 0.003, respectively. The resulting implicit price ratios are not
the same as those obtained using the original method. For example, the
poverty and unemployment ratio changes from 2.4 to 4.6.
The results of the two approaches are reported in Table 4 where we see
that the choice of indicator does affect rankings for all but five countries
(Belgium, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal). Most movements are
Table 4 Sensitivity analysis—social protection index, 2006
SPI1 SPI2 SPI3
Scores Rank Scores Rank Scores Rank
AT 0.82 4 1.22 3 0.79 1
BE 0.57 9 0.91 9 0.76 7
DE 0.58 8 0.90 11 0.76 7
DK 0.75 6 1.40 1 0.79 1
ES 0.40 14 0.68 14 0.71 14
FI 0.78 5 1.19 4 0.79 1
FR 0.83 2 1.07 6 0.78 5
GR 0.45 12 0.91 9 0.73 12
IE 0.55 10 0.89 12 0.75 10
IT 0.41 13 0.73 13 0.73 12
LU 0.67 7 1.03 7 0.76 7
NL 0.83 2 1.15 5 0.78 5
PT 0.16 15 0.65 15 0.68 15
SE 0.91 1 1.25 2 0.79 1
UK 0.54 11 1.02 8 0.75 10
Mean 0.62 1.00 0.76
Note: SPI1, SPI2 and SPI3 results correspond to HDI, Afonso et al. and ‘goalpost’ nor-
malization data, respectively.
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small, although France and Denmark move by four and five places,
respectively, which is not insignificant in a table of 15 countries. We
also note that the mean score SPI2 is higher, at one. This is not unex-
pected, since the average indicator in this case is one while in the previous
case the maximum was one.
Also reported in Table 4 are a third set of results, SPI3. These are
derived using a method closely related to the HDI approach. The only
difference is that instead of using the sample minimum and maximums,
alternative ‘goalposts’ are used, following the suggestion provided
in Anand and Sen (1994). In that paper, the authors note that using
in the original HDR (1990) minimum and maximum sample values in
the scaling process will be problematic when between year comparisons
are made because the minimum and maximum sample values will dif-
fer from year to year. They instead suggested the use of ‘goalpost’
values, which reflect their assessments of retrospective and prospec-
tive limits. For example, they suggest a range of 35 to 85 for life
expectancy and 0 to 100 for education. Using similar logic to theirs
we could argue that the ranges for poverty and unemployment
should also be 0 to 100. Identifying a range for the inequality indicator
is more difficult. Hence we have decided to invert it and multiply it by 100,
meaning that it now has a natural range from 0 (the poorest 20% earn
nothing) to 100 (the poorest 20% earn the same amount as the richest
20%).
The SPI3 results are reported in Table 4. The ranks are similar to SPI1,
though some countries have a notable change in rank, with Austria,
Denmark, and Finland all improving by three or more places. We also
observe that the mean score is higher and the range of scores is narrower,
ranging from 0.68 to 0.79, as compared with 0.16 to 0.91 for SPI1. This is
again as expected, since the ‘goalposts’ for each of the five original indi-
cators are wider than the sample ranges.
In Table 7, we give the correlation coefficients for several measures.
The correlations between the three alternative indices are all 88%
or higher, indicating strong but not perfect correlation between these
indices.
5.1 DEA analysis
The above two alternative sets of scaled indicators were also used in DEA
models. The results are reported in Table 5, along with the original set of
scores. The first point to note is that the mean DEA score increases from
89% for DEA1 to 99% for DEA2 and DEA3. This is purely a conse-
quence of the different scaling methods used, and emphasizes that when
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data does not have a natural scale, one should take great care in inter-
preting the relative sizes of efficiency scores.19
The rankings in the three different sets of DEA results do vary to some
extent, with a few countries, such as the UK, experiencing some large
changes. Overall, the DEA rankings appear to be more stable than the
SPI rankings. This is most likely due to the fact that the DEA implicit
weights can self-adjust to the different scaling methods, while the SPI
measures have fixed rigid weights.
The means of the implicit weights from the three DEA models are listed
in Table 6. The weights change notably across the three models. In par-
ticular, the weights in the DEA2 model vary notably from 0.2, with the life
expectancy indicator given a large weight of in excess of 0.7. This is likely
to be a consequence of the fact that it is the only indicator that was not
inverted prior to inclusion in the DEA model. This observation should
Table 5 Sensitivity analysis—DEA efficiency scores, 2006
DEA1 DEA2 DEA3
Scores Rank Scores Rank Scores Rank
AT 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
BE 0.866 13 0.981 11 0.978 14
DE 0.879 12 0.986 9 0.982 12
DK 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
ES 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
FI 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
FR 0.983 7 0.999 7 0.998 7
GR 0.899 9 0.981 11 0.995 9
IE 0.890 11 0.984 10 0.984 11
IT 0.672 14 0.988 8 0.980 13
LU 0.897 10 0.980 13 0.995 9
NL 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
PT 0.374 15 0.973 15 0.972 15
SE 1.000 1 1.000 1 1.000 1
UK 0.938 8 0.979 14 0.997 8
Mean 0.893 0.990 0.992
Note: DEA1, DEA2 and DEA3 results correspond to HDI, Afonso et al. and ‘goalpost’
normalization data, respectively.
19 Unfortunately, the invariance properties of DEA models are not widely recognized.
Most standard DEA models are invariant to multiplicative scaling but they are generally
not invariant to additive translation or nonlinear transformations, such as inversion. See
Lovell and Pastor (1995) for a detailed discussion of scaling and translation invariance
properties in DEA models.
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serve as a warning to others who may apply data transformations to
indicators prior to including them in an equal-weighted aggregate index
calculation. The choice of what transformation to use (in this case inver-
sion version linear transformation) can have a substantive effect upon the
results obtained.
In Table 7, we provide sample correlations across our 6 indices/scores.
One observes reasonably strong correlations between the various mea-
sures, which is reassuring. Thus, in Section 6, when we study the evolution
of performance over a 12-year period, we will focus our attention on one
set of indicators: DEA1 and SPI1, without the risk of our choice having a
large effect on our results.
6 Convergence
Thus far, we have focused on the year 2006. We now use data on five
social indicators covering 12 years. It is interesting to see whether or not
we observe any trend and particularly any convergence. In other words, do
we see that countries that did not fare well at the beginning of this 12-year
period do progressively catch up? To study that evolution, we use our two
approaches: average indicator and DEA, but we restrict the analysis to the
HDI normalization.
Table 6 Means of the DEA implicit weights
POV INE UNE EDU EXP
DEA1 0.062 0.067 0.237 0.460 0.174
DEA2 0.080 0.080 0.072 0.030 0.738
DEA3 0.047 0.100 0.419 0.101 0.333
Table 7 Correlations between indexes
SPI1 SPI2 SPI3 DEA1 DEA2 DEA3
SPI1 1.000
SPI2 0.884 1
SPI3 0.968 0.895 1.000
DEA1 0.778 0.671 0.770 1.000
DEA2 0.708 0.589 0.630 0.685 1.000
DEA3 0.692 0.689 0.593 0.836 0.721 1.000
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For the average indicator SPI1, we have normalized the primary indi-
cators over the whole period. In other words, a value of 1 is given to the
country and the year that has the best indicator (e.g. the lowest poverty
rate) and vice-versa for the value of 0. Consider the poverty indicator.
With the lowest poverty rate we have Sweden in 1995–1999 and Finland in
1995–1997. Their normalized indicator is thus 1. The highest poverty rate
is in Portugal in 1995. Summing up these normalized indicators and divid-
ing by 5, we obtain an average indicator for each country and each year.
These are presented on Figure 1.
In Figure 1, it is evident that in all countries (except Sweden) there has
been a sharp improvement, particularly among the lagging countries:
Spain, Ireland, and Portugal. This seems to indicate some catching up
with the best student of the ‘European class’, namely Sweden. To check
whether there is convergence, one can regress the variation in the indicator
at hand, here SPI1, against its value in 1995. The results of this regression
are presented in Figure 2. As we can see, with a slope coefficient of 0.109












AT BE DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SE UK
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Figure 1 Average indicator SPI1 1995–2006.
20 For the SPI and the DEA, we have tested the case of convergence for the three types of
scaling. However, we only report here the results pertaining to the first type. The other
results are available on request.
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DEA technical efficiency measures for each year have to be computed.21
Here too that many countries with a score below 1 improve over the
12-year period. However, we have to keep in mind that these DEA tech-
nical efficiency measures are relative to a best practice frontier that is
constructed using data only from the year at hand. Hence, movements
in this frontier from year to year are not captured by the technical effi-
ciency measure.
In other words, the performance of a country over time can be decom-
posed in two elements. Take two countries A and B, and two years. A is on
the frontier in the two years, but it is doing better from one year to the
other, which means that the frontier moves up. We look at the perfor-
mance of B with respect to that moving best practice frontier; we can
decompose it into (i) the change in distance with respect to the best prac-
tice frontier and (ii) the change of the best practice frontier itself.
To accommodate the two types of changes, we use a technique that is
used in production theory. It rests on the Malmquist index that gives the
rate at which the frontier moves up and the rate at which the distance to
the frontier changes over time.22 Table 8 gives the yearly changes and the













































Figure 2 Convergence of SPI1.
21 See http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/crepp-wp200903.pdf for the DEA scores for
each year.
22 See Coelli et al. (2005) for details.
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only the three Nordic countries that are also those with the highest levels
but also Portugal.
The indicators presented on Table 8 can be decomposed in a change in
the frontier (Technical change) and a change in the distance to the frontier
(Efficiency change).23
As with the indicator SP11, we wish to check whether or not there is
some catching up with our DEA1 measure. In Figure 3, we regress the
average annual Malmquist TFP growth measure against the DEA1 mea-
sure in 1995. As we can see, there is convergence with a R2¼ 0.36. When
we only consider the variation in ‘technical efficiency’ the convergence
appears to be stronger with a R2¼ 0.55 as it appears on Figure 4. This
seems to imply that relative to their own best practice frontier, European
countries tend to converge unambiguously.
7 Conclusions
The purpose of this article was to present some guidelines as to the ques-
tion of measuring the performance of social protection. We believe that












































Figure 3 Convergence of DEA1 according to Malmquist TFP change.
23 The formula is given by Malmquist þ 1 ¼ (efficiency change þ 1) * (technical change þ
1). Those two components are given in http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/
crepp-wp200903.pdf.
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compare welfare states on the basis of questionable indicators. Second, a
good measure can induce national governments that are not well ranked to
get closer to the best practice frontier. This is the spirit of the European
OMC (Open Method of Coordination) that has lead to the annual pub-
lication of indicators of social inclusion for the EU member countries.
In this article, we propose two approaches: one based on a simple aver-
age of partial indicators and the other based on DEA. The advantage of
DEA is to provide flexible and endogenous weights for our inclusion indi-
cators. Another issue we deal with is that of normalization. In our sensi-
tivity analysis, we show that our results are somehow sensitive to the
scaling indicators. We consider three types of scaling and do not have
solid grounds to prefer one over the other. However, they fortunately
lead to quite similar evaluations. DEA scores look higher because they
are relative to observed best practices and not to a theoretical benchmark
like the index numbers.
We then discuss two questions: (i) Do we have to limit ourselves to a
simple performance comparison or can we conduct an efficiency study? (ii)
How do our performance measures evolves over time? Do we witness any
race to the bottom? Even though we realize that our performance mea-
sures depend on the resources invested by the state to finance alternative
social protection programs, we deliberately restrict ourselves to perfor-
mance comparison and argue against the calculation of efficiency mea-
sures as it is usually done for micro-units. The reason is simple: the link












































Figure 4 Convergence of DEA1 according to ‘technical efficiency’ change.
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clear and does not reveal a clear-cut production technology. More con-
cretely, factors that can affect performance are missing. For example, cli-
mate can affect health and social attitudes can affect education.
Another finding of our article is that there appears to be some clear
convergence in performance among European countries, suggesting that
the Open Method of Coordination may be achieving its desired outcome.
This latter result is quite interesting. There is so much talk of social dump-
ing and of a race to the bottom that it is comforting to realize that most
countries perform better and in a converging way.
The fact that even with an enlarged measure of social inclusion the
Nordic countries lead the pack is not surprising. It is neither surprising
to see that Mediterranean countries are not doing well. What is surprising
is to see that with such an enlarged concept Anglo-Saxon welfare states do
as well as the Continental welfare states such as Germany and France.
As a final comment, let us come back to the selection of social inclusion
indicators. The gist of this article is to measure the performance of social
protection on the basis of its two main objectives: poverty and inequality
reduction and protection against lifetime risks. If there were no problem
with data availability, the indicators we would like to use would primarily
concern the distribution of individual welfare over the lifecycle and across
individuals. That ideal measure of welfare would include consumption,
education, health, and employment. Unfortunately, such evidence does
not exist for the EU15 over a sufficiently long period. As a consequence,
we have relied upon the indicators made available in the framework of the
OMC.
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